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Introduction
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Florida v. Jardines,1 courts
have been left grappling with the full extent of the additional protection
afforded to residents from warrantless canine drug sniffing. Jardines
involved the taking of a police drug dog up to the porch and front door
of a single-family, detached house “via the driveway and a paved path.”2
After “energetically exploring the area for the strongest point source of
[an] odor” the dog alerted by sitting at “the base of the front door.”3
The Court, in holding that this warrantless activity was beyond the
bounds of permitted conduct, noted that “[t]he government’s use of
1.

133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).

2.

Id. at 1421 (Alito, J., dissenting).

3.

Id. at 1413.
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trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate
surroundings is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”4
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, arrived at the
conclusion not through a Katz “reasonable expection of privacy”
analysis,5 but through a determination that the drug sniffing occurred
in “an area belonging to Jardines and immediately surrounding his
house—in the curtilage of the house, which we have held enjoys protection as part of the home itself.”6 In doing so, the Court returned to
an earlier conception of “constitutionally protected areas” that had
been largely overshadowed since the advent of the Katz privacy test.7
Both tests remain viable approaches to determining Fourth
Amendment searches,8 but the Jardines majority declined to address
whether the drug sniffing was also a search under the Katz test.9 Justice
Kagan authored a concurring opinion finding that the drug sniff was
both a trespass and an invasion of privacy sufficient to find it a search
under both Katz and Kyllo v. United States.10 Kagan maintained that
she “could just as happily have decided [the case] by looking to

4.

Id. at 1417–18.

5.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In
his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan expounded on the two-part rule that
has been subsequently applied by lower courts as the “reasonable-expectationof-privacy test.” See id. (“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”).

6.

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414.

7.

See Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Application of the
Curtilage Doctrine to Urban and Suburban Areas, 15 Geo. Mason U. C.R.
L.J. 297, 300 (2005) (“In Katz, the Court signaled a sharp change in its
search and seizure jurisprudence by abandoning the traditional framework of
‘constitutionally protected areas’ in favor of a privacy-based test for Fourth
Amendment application.”).

8.

See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 (“The Katz reasonable-expectations test ‘has
been added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012))).

9.

Id. (“Thus, we need not decide whether the officers’ investigation of Jardines’
home violated his expectation of privacy under Katz.”).

10.

533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001) (holding that police officers’ observation of a house
using thermal-imaging technology, and, more generally, “obtaining by senseenhancing technology any information regarding the home’s interior that
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search” under the Fourth
Amendment (citation omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 512 (1961))).
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Jardines’s privacy interests”11 because a drug dog is a device “not ‘in
general public use,’ [and] training it on a home violates our ‘minimal
expectation of privacy’—an expectation ‘that exists, and that is
acknolwedged to be reasonable.’”12 However, it “is unclear . . . whether
Justices Scalia and Thomas, who did not join in the concurring opinion
which does apply the Katz analysis, would disagree with the result
reached by the concurring opinion that the conduct violates the
respondent’s reasonable expectation of privacy . . . .”13 The lingering
questions surrounding Jardines have left lower courts to address the
full implication of the decision.
In particular, the Supreme Court left open two critical questions:
“Does the Fourth Amendment protection-afforded concept of curtilage
exist outside the context of a single-family dwelling”14 and, if not, does
an apartment dweller have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
area just outside his door? In this most recent term, the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits expanded the protections against warrantless drug dog
sniffs to multiunit dwellings, but only one has answered that question
in the affirmative. While both Circuits found drug sniffs of the front
doors of apartments to be searches, the Eighth Circuit15 arrived at the
conclusion through the Jardines majority’s “constitutionally protected
area” analysis,16 while the Seventh Circuit17 found that such a police
action violated a tenant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.18

I. United States v. Hopkins:
Expanding Jardines Protections Through
“Constitutionally Protected Area” Analysis
The Jardines majority opinion employed a two-part series of
questions to identify the dog sniff as a Fourth Amendment search: (1)

11.

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).

12.

Id. at 1419 (Kagan, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Kyllo, 533
U.S. at 34).

13.

Carol A. Chase, Cops, Canines, and Curtilage: What Jardines Teaches and
What It Leaves Unanswered, 52 Hous. L. Rev. 1289, 1294 (2015).

14.

Id. at 1303; see also David C. Roth, Comment, Florida v. Jardines:
Trespassing on the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 91 Denv. U. L.
Rev. 551, 570 (2014) (“[T]he [Jardines] majority’s fact-specific analysis
cannot answer what would have happened had Mr. Jardines been living in
an apartment when the police brought a drug-dog to his front door.”).

15.

United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726 (8th Cir. 2016).

16.

See infra Part I.

17.

United States v. Whitaker, 820 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2016).

18.

See infra Part II.
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was the information obtained within a constitutionally protected area19
and (2) if so, was the officer given leave, explicitly or implicilty, to do
so?20 The majority found that the officers “were gathering information
in an area belonging to Jardines and immediately surrounding his
house—in the curtilage of the house . . . [a]nd they gathered that
information by physically entering and occupying the area to engage in
conduct not explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner.”21
Several lower courts have analyzed dog sniffs on the threshold of
apartment doors by utilizing the same two-question approach highlighed in Jardines.
A. Was the Information Obtained Within a
Constitutionally Protected Area?

Following Jardines, lower courts have looked anew at the concept
of curtilage within multiunit dwellings. Prior to Jardines, the
“overwhelming weight of authority reject[ed] the proposition that a
resident of a multi-dwelling residential building can claim curtilage
protection in common areas—or even anywhere outside an individual
unit.” 22 Like all Fourth Amendment questions regarding searches,
determining whether a search was conducted within a constitutionally
protected area is a fact-specific endeavor, “requir[ing] [a] consideration
of factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably may expect
that the area in question should be treated as the home itself.” 23
Although narrowly defined, Hopkins is the most recent example of a
lower court finding curtilage within a multiunit dwelling and the
highest court to do so to this point.24

19.

Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013) (“The front porch is the
classic exemplar of an area adjacent to the home and ‘to which the activity
of home life extends.’” (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182
n.12 (1984))).

20.

Id. (“While law enforcement officers need not ‘shield their eyes’ when
passing by the home ‘on public thoroughfares,’ an officer’s leave to gather
information is sharply circumscribed when he steps off those thoroughfares
and enters the Fourth Amendment’s protected areas.” (citation omitted)
(quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986))).

21.

Id. at 1414.

22.

Chase, supra note 13, at 1305. One of the few exceptions in which a court
did find curtilage in a multiunit dwelling can be found in Fixel v.
Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding the fenced backyard
of a four-unit apartment building to be curtilage).

23.

United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United
States v. Bausby, 720 F.3d 652, 656 (8th Cir. 2013)).

24.

The Eighth Circuit previously found an area under an apartment’s exterior
window to be protected curtilage in United States v. Burston, 806 F.3d 1123
(8th Cir. 2015).
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Donnell Hopkins rented a townhome in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, that
was part of a complex of several “rectangular buildings separated by a
grid of streets and sidewalks.”25 Each building has several two-story
townhouses on each side with “doors . . . arranged in pairs, and
walkways lead[ing] from a sidewalk in the central courtyard to a
concrete slab in front of each pair of doors.”26 The door to each townhouse was an exterior exit—opening directly to the outside rather than
an indoor hallway common to most apartment buildings.27 A Cedar
Rapids officer and his K-9 partner, Marco, approached the townhouse
complex at 10:00 pm on a Monday night, upon which Marco was
unleashed and allowed to sniff the apartment walls, including the
bottoms of the doors.28 Marco sat in front of Hopkins’s apartment door,
indicating “that an odor of narcotics was coming from inside.”29 Marco’s
indication was the basis for a search warrant that was obtained the
following day—leading to Hopkins’s eventual arrest for possession with
intent to distribute controlled substances.30
The Eighth Circuit reviewed Hopkins’s appeal from a magistrate’s
conclusion that the evidence was admissible and the district court’s
denial of a motion to suppress.31 The court employed the Jardines twostep “constitutionally protected area” analysis to determine whether
the dog sniff was unconstitutional. 32 First, the court determined
whether Hopkins’s front door and porch constituted a constitutionally
protected area, or curtilage.
In determining whether the contested area was protected curtilage,
the court utilized the four-factor test developed in United States v.
25.

Hopkins, 824 F.3d at 729.

26.

Id. Each pair of townhouse doors is “separated by a wall approximately one
foot wide” and “has one first story window facing the courtyard.” Id. at 729–
30.

27.

Id. at 729.

28.

Id. at 729–30.

29.

Id. at 730.

30.

Id. After further surveillance, Hopkins was arrested and a search of the townhouse revealed shoeboxes containing heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. Id.

31.

Id. at 731. See United States v. Hopkins, No. CR14-0120, 2015 WL 4087054,
at *6–7 (N.D. Iowa July 6, 2015) (finding that, though the “search warrant
is invalid,” and the dog sniff is “a violation of Defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights, the Leon exception provides the exclusionary rule does not apply, and
the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant is nonetheless admissible”);
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920–21 (1984) (holding that evidence is
still admissible if “an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a
search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope,” even
though the warrant was later determined to be invalid).

32.

Hopkins, 824 F.3d at 731–33 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415
(2013)).
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Dunn.33 In defining the extent of a home’s curtilage, the Dunn Court
advocated looking to four factors:
[1.] the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home[;]
[2.] whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding
the home[;]
[3.] the nature of the uses to which the area is put[;] and
[4.] the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from
observation by people passing by.34

The decision of the Hopkins court to use the Dunn factors in its
analysis is noteworthy because the Jardines majority “did not apply
those factors or even cite Dunn.”35 The Jardines majority opinion may
have omitted any reference to Dunn because the front porch of a singlefamily house was an obvious example of curtilage and “the classic
exemplar of an area adjacent to the home and ‘to which the activity of
home life extends.’”36 Despite the Jardines majority’s relunctance to
employ the Dunn factors, lower courts have frequently cited and relied
heavily upon those factors in determining whether curtilage exists
within multiunit dwellings.
Because the Dunn factors were originally developed when considering the curtilage designation of a barn,37 there are real questions
regarding the factors’ applicability to urban settings. While the curtilage boundaries of single-family detached homes may be as easily defined
as the Jardines majority envisions,38 the task is not as clear for the
“majority of modern Americans . . . [who] live in urban and quasiurban (suburban) areas.”39 Lower courts look to the Dunn factors when
grappling with whether multiunit dwellings have curtilage because
“[t]he leading Supreme Court cases delineating the modern scope of the
33.

480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).

34.

Id.

35.

People v. Burns, 50 N.E.3d 610, 632 (Ill. 2016).

36.

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
182 n.12).

37.

Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302–03.

38.

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12) (“While
the boundaries of the curtilage are generally ‘clearly marked,’ the ‘conception
defining the curtilage’ is at any rate familiar enough that it is ‘easily
understood from our daily experience.’”).

39.

Leonetti, supra note 7, at 303 (“In an urban or suburban environment, the
home is generally coextensive with the entire property, in that intimate
residential activities extend throughout the lot on which the dwelling is
located.” (emphasis omitted)).
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curtilage doctrine . . . largely leave unanswered the questions of
whether curtilage exists in these urban contexts, and if so, what the
scope of urban curtilage is.”40 While many of these evaluations have
yielded familiar answers—that common areas, such as apartment
hallways, are not curtilage—some court applications of the Dunn
factors have led to findings of curtilage in multiunit dwellings.
In Lindsey v. State,41 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals found
that applying the Dunn factors did not reveal the area outside of an
apartment door to be curtilage. Other than proximity, the Lindsey
court concluded the other Dunn factors did not indicate the area was
curtilage.42 The court held that the storing of “decorations, bicycles,
and shoes” outside of the apartment “strongly suggests that [the areas]
were not being used for intimate activities within one’s home.”43 With
regard to the fourth Dunn factor, the court found that “the area was
observable by a passerby” and, rather than indicating any purpose to
preserve privacy, the lock and buzzer system securing the doors of the
apartment building “functioned as a security mechanism.”44 Finally, the
Lindsey court grounded much of its findings in the conception of
exclusive control.45 Unlike Jardines’s front porch of his single-family
house, “common areas, such as the hallways of a multi-unit apartment
building, are generally not areas in which a tenant is deemed to have
‘exclusive control.’” 46 The ability to exclude others, though not
explicitly stated within the Dunn factors, has been inferred from the
language of the third and fourth factors by the Lindsey court and
several other jurisdictions. 47 The court’s citing a lack of “exclusive
control” for the absence of curtilage may also be an allusion to the

40.

Id.

41.

127 A.3d 627 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015). Lindsey involved a warrant obtained
after a positive alert from a K-9 drug dog in front of the defendant’s
apartment door. Id. at 631.

42.

Id. at 642 (“Although the area outside of appellant’s door was in close
proximity to the apartment, appellant has not demonstrated that the
circumstances before us satisfy the factors outlined in Dunn.”).

43.

Id. at 643.

44.

Id.

45.

See id.

46.

Id.

47.

Id. (“Both [the third and fourth Dunn] factors suggest that curtilage . . . is
within an area where the individual maintains some form of exclusive
control.”).
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language within Jardines, referring to the porch in question as
“belonging to Jardines”48 and “Jardines’s property.”49
Such was the case in United States v. Bain.50 Unlike Lindsey, the
Bain court found that “several of the Dunn factors favor finding that
the area surrounding the door” to an apartment “falls within the
curtilage of the home.” 51 Nevertheless, Bain also focused upon the
concept of exclusive control, citing First Circuit precedent that, “[i]n a
modern urban multifamily apartment house . . . a tenant’s ‘dwelling’
cannot reasonably be said to extend beyond his own apartment and
perhaps any separate areas subject to his exclusive control.”52 Because
the area beyond the apartment door was open to other tenants, guests,
and the landlord, the “threshold of the door . . . cannot be classified
as a ‘separate area[] subject to [the tenant’s] exclusive control.’”53
The dissenting opinion in People v. Burns54 also relied upon the
concept of exclusive control in objecting to the majority’s finding that
an apartment landing constituted curtilage.55 In addition to arguing
that the Dunn factors militated against a finding that the apartment
landing was curtilage, 56 the dissent found conclusive the fact that,
“[u]nlike in Jardines, the area in question here did not belong to
defendant, nor did she have exclusive control over it, and there was no
48.

Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).

49.

Id. at 1417.

50.

155 F. Supp. 3d 107 (D. Mass. 2015).

51.

Id. at 119. Specifically, the court noted that the area was “in immediate
proximity to the home, as close to the home as the front porch in Jardines,”
and was in the larger enclosure of the locked building. Id. Unlike Lindsey, the
Bain court found that pictures of the apartment landing just outside the door,
which “depict[ed] items such as a set of drawers, a mat, shoes, and a
decorative wreath,” indicated that the tenants “might have used this area as
an extension of the home similar to a front porch.” Id. at 114 n.3, 120. Lastly,
in contrast again to Lindsey, the Bain decision found the locking of the
apartment building’s external doors to show “residents took steps to protect
the area from the general public.” Id. at 120.

52.

Id. at 120 (quoting United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st
Cir. 1976)).

53.

Id. (quoting Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d at 558).

54.

50 N.E.3d 610 (Ill. 2016).

55.

Id. at 636 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Burns involved an unwarranted drug
dog sniff of a third-floor landing and apartment door. Id. at 614.

56.

Id. at 639 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In any event, I disagree with the
majority’s application of the Dunn factors and would reach the exact opposite
conclusion, finding that all four factors weigh in favor of finding that the
common landing area was not curtilage.”). The dissent also noted “the United
States Supreme Court has never used the Dunn factors to find that an area
not belonging to defendant’s home can be his curtilage.” Id.
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trespass [by the police or K-9 drug dog] as far as defendant was
concerned.”57 Finally, the dissenting opinion in State v. Rendon,58 unlike the majority opinion, cited the Dunn factors to argue against a
finding that the area in front of an apartment door was curtilage.59 The
dissent found that only the proximity factor of Dunn indicated a finding
of curtilage, while the defendant’s use of the space,60 the openness of
the walkway to public view61 and lack of enclosure62 weighed strongly
against such a finding.
As evidenced by the analysis from several jurisdictions, courts have
looked to the Dunn factors, both in the plain language of the text and
the inferred reference to exclusive control, to argue against the concept
of curtilage within multiunit dwellings.
Though much rarer, there are instances in which the Dunn factors
have led to a finding of curtilage in a multiunit context. In determining
whether a condominium owner’s private front porch was considered
curtilage, the District of New Mexico applied the Dunn factors, finding
that “[t]he porch is attached to his home; it is recessed and visually
distinguishable from the public area of the condominum complex; and
it houses furniture, which Defendant uses for normal activities of daily
living, such as dining.” 63 Several courts have also found the Dunn
factors support a finding of curtilage in some instances of apartment
57.

Id. at 637.

58.

477 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

59.

Id. at 818 (Yeary, J., dissenting). Rendon involved a drug dog sniff of the
upstairs hallway of a four-unit apartment building. Id. at 806–07.

60.

Id. at 818 (finding that defendant, unlike his neighbors, did not utilize the
walkways for “some limited measure of domestic intimacy (if not exactly
privacy)”).

61.

Id. (“The walkway remained fully available to public view and public
access . . . [and] the fact that it led only to Appellee’s threshold does not
establish the degree of intimate use and privacy necessary to equate it with
the home.”).

62.

See id. at 818 (“There was no enclosure surrounding Appellee’s front door. It
was open for any passerby directly to see, and Appellee took no steps (nor
is there any showing that, by the terms of his lease, he would have been
permitted to take steps) to obscure the public view.”). Unlike the majority
decision in United States v. Bain, 155 F. Supp. 3d 107 (D. Mass. 2015),
which found the space in front of an apartment door to be “enclosed” by
the larger apartment building, the Rendon dissent argued that such a space
was not within any enclosure that would satisfy the Dunn factors.

63.

United States v. Soza, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1150 (D.N.M. 2016). The
finding of curtilage in this case may be narrow, however, because the court
noted that the evidence “indicate[d] that the Defendant’s porch is more like
a porch to a single family dwelling, which would typically be considered
curtilage, than the common hallway of an apartment complex, which would
not.” Id.
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common areas. In Burns, the Illinois Supreme Court majority decision
found a third-floor apartment landing to be curtilage.64 In doing so, the
court remarked that the landing, which allowed access to two
apartments, satisifed the Dunn factors because it was in an area located
within a locked structure, unobservable by and intended to exclude the
general public, located directly outside of defendant’s apartment door,
and limited in use to the defendant and the tenant of the one other
apartment on the landing. 65 In finding an apartment hallway to be
curtilage, an Indiana Court of Appeals remarked, “Simply because one
lives in an apartment does not mean that he or she does not at times
occupy the space immediately outside of the apartment home.” 66
Finally, the Eighth Circuit had previously applied the Dunn factors to
the question of whether the portion of a wall immediatley below the
exterior window of a townhouse was curtilage.67 In finding the location
to be curtilage, the court noted that the area was in close proximity to
the apartment, was used by the defendant for grilling, and was partially
screened by a bush.68
Not every court, however, has cited the Dunn factors in a finding
of curtilage. As mentioned previously, the majority opinion in Rendon
did not use the factors in concluding that a dog sniff occurred at “the
threshold of appellee’s apartment-home and thus was clearly included
within the physical-intrusion theory of Jardines.” 69 Mirroring the

64.

People v. Burns, 50 N.E.3d 610, 621 (Ill. 2016).

65.

Id. at 620–21 (“The landing is a clearly marked area within a locked building
with limited use and restricted access, ‘familiar enough that it is “easily
understood from our daily experience.”’” (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.
Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013))).

66.

Robertson v. State, 740 N.E.2d 574, 576 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), vacated on
other grounds, 765 N.E.2d 138 (Ind. 2002) (holding that the at-issue statute’s
definition of dwelling did not include curtilage). In supporting its conclusion,
the Indiana Court of Appeals noted that apartment dwellers “often hang
decorations on outside doors and place doormats on the ground outside the
door,” and “place and keep personal items on their steps or porches.”
Robertson, 740 N.E.2d at 576.

67.

United States v. Burston, 806 F.3d 1123 (8th Cir. 2015). Burston considered
a dog sniff in the same apartment complex at issue in Hopkins, conducted by
the very same officer and K-9 team. See United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d
726, 731 (8th Cir. 2016) (“In Burston, Officer Fear led Marco around the
exterior walls of a different building at the Cambridge Townhomes.”).

68.

Burston, 806 F.3d at 1127 (“Consideration of the first, third, and fourth Dunn
factors outweighs the one Dunn factor that arguably militates against finding
the area to be part of the home’s curtilage, i.e., the area was not surrounded
by an enclosure.”).

69.

State v. Rendon, 477 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (emphasis
added).
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majority decision in Jardines, the Rendon court avoided the Dunn
factors by alluding to the ease by which the question could be resolved.70
The Hopkins court joined those courts finding curtilage within a
mutliunit dwelling by citing to the Dunn factors.71 The court found that
proximity of the area in front of the townhouse door indicated curtilage,
as did the residents’ use of the space.72 The court, however, noted that
the lack of an enclosure around the door and its openness to observation
weighed against a finding of curtilage. 73 Nevertheless, despite the
divided analysis, the court concluded that “the combination of Dunn
factors supports a finding of curtilage.” 74 The Hopkins holding was
narrower, however, than Burns because of the unique facts of the case.
The townhouse homes within Hopkins had exterior entrances with a
stone slab that only Hopkins and his guests would encounter.75 There
was no interior common hallway as found within an apartment
building. 76 Because of this, Hopkins may be less far-reaching in its
impact than Whitaker.77
B. If Information Was Obtained by the Drug Dog Sniff Within a
Constitutionally Protected Area, Was the Officer Given Leave,
Explicitly or Implicilty, to Do So?

If the warrantless drug sniff conducted by the K-9 team was conducted within a constitutionally protected area, such as curtilage, the
next step in determining whether it constituted a search under the
Fourth Amendment is to ascertain whether the officer was given license

70.

Id. at 810 (“[W]e conclude that application of the property-rights baseline
renders the present case a straightforward one.”).

71.

United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 2016) (“We examine
four factors in particular . . . .” (citing United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,
301 (1987))).

72.

Hopkins, 824 F.3d at 732 (“[T]he areas next to the doors of these apartments
and along the walls are used for grilling and storing bicycles.”).

73.

Id. (“[T]he front of the door was not enclosed by a fence or wall and was not
protected from observation by visitors (though neither was the front porch in
Jardines).” (citation omitted)).

74.

Id. The court also noted that “‘[d]aily experience’ also suggests that the area
immediately in front of the door of the apartments in this complex is
curtilage.” Id. (citing Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415).

75.

Id. (“Hopkins’ door faced outside, and the walkway leading up to it was
‘common’ only to Hopkins and his immediate neighbor. Even his neighbor
would not pass within 6 to 8 inches of Hopkins’ door when going to his own.”).

76.

Id. (“In our case, however, there is no ‘common hallway’ which all residents
or guests must use to reach their units.”).

77.

See infra Part II.

319

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 1·2016
Growing Jardines

to do so.78 The license may be explicit, by way of consent, or it may be
implied either in a narrow 79 or broader 80 sense. If an officer avails
himself of an implied license by walking up to the door of the dwelling,
he “must confine himself to the prescribed route, rather than treating
the invitation as one to roam the property at will, peering into the
windows of the home.”81 Jardines upheld the idea that a police officer
may approach the door to engage a resident in discussion,82 however,
the majority decision noted that “there is no customary invitation” to
“introduc[e] a trained police dog to explore the area around the home
in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence.”83 Jardines introduced
the analysis of an officer’s subjective intent in determining whether he
had exceeded the implied license. 84 However, because the Jardines
78.

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (“Since the officers’ investigation took place in
a constitutionally protected area, we turn to the question of whether it was
accomplished through an unlicensed physical intrusion.”).

79.

See Leonetti, supra note 7, at 305 (observing that courts may often use the
idea of implied invitation “in the narrow sense that, by putting garbage in
the place of regular collection, even if upon the curtilage, a resident has
extended an implied invitation to the collectors to come get it, so that the
police may also avail themselves of that invitation”).

80.

See id. (observing that courts may also use the idea of implied invitation “in
the broader sense that, merely by having a driveway, front walk, porch, etc.,
a resident has impliedly invited all business and social visitors to approach
the home”).

81.

United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109, 1130 (7th Cir. 1998).

82.

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 (“Thus, a police officer not armed with a warrant
may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is ‘no more than
any private citizen might do.’” (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469
(2011))); see also United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 993 (10th Cir.
2016) (“Jardines left our preexisting knock-and-talk precedent
undisturbed.”). The “knock and talk” exception, after Jardines, also
“depends at least in part on an officer’s subjective intent” and must
ordinarily conform to “normal waking hours” unless there is evidence
indicating a subject “generally accepted visitors” at a late hour. United
States v. Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2016).

83.

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 (“An invitation to engage in canine forensic investigation assuredly does not inhere in the very act of hanging a knocker.”).

84.

Id. (“The scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only to a
particular area but also to a specific purpose . . . . Here, the background
social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite him to conduct
a search.”). Jardines’s factoring in of the officer’s subjective intent goes
against “nearly forty years of case law,” but a thorough examination of the
ramifications of that choice is beyond the scope of this Comment. George M.
Dery III, Failing to Keep “Easy Cases Easy”: Florida v. Jardines Refuses to
Reconcile Inconsistencies in Fourth Amendment Privacy Law by Instead
Focusing on Physical Trespass, 47 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 451, 476 (2014). Dery
notes that questions of an officer’s intent arguably could be “perfectly proper
areas of inquiry, but they directly conflict with the prohibition against
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majority was unusually clear in stating that using a drug dog to sniff
the area around a door’s threshold violates the “background social
norms that invite a visitor to the front door,”85 lower courts that have
found a K-9 drug sniff was conducted in constitutionally protected
curtilage have similarly found that such a sniff exceeded any implied
license.86
This was the outcome in Hopkins once it was determined the dog
had sniffed from within constitutionally protected curtilage in front of
the apartment door.87 The Eighth Circuit noted that “[t]he walkway in
this case created an implied invitation for a visitor to go up and knock
on one or both of the two doors, but not for an officer to approach with
a trained police dog within inches of either of the doors ‘in hopes of
discovering incriminating evidence.’”88 Hopkins, by finding a dog sniff
was conducted from curtilage in excess of any implied license, represents
the highest appellate expansion of the Jardines majority’s

subjectivity that the Court has imposed on Fourth Amendment litigation.”
Id.
85.

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416.

86.

See, e.g., United States v. Burston, 806 F.3d 1123, 1127 (8th Cir. 2015)
(“[E]ven absent the intent to search . . . police officers would not have an
implicit license to stand six to ten inches from the window in front of
Burston’s apartment.”); People v. Burns, 50 N.E.3d 610, 622 (Ill. 2016) (“In
contrast to Jardines, the police conduct in this case certainly exceeded the
scope of the license to approach defendant’s apartment door when the officers
entered a locked building in the middle of the night and they remained in the
building for more than ‘a very short period of time,’ even taking time to have
the drug-detection dog conduct an open-air sweep of other apartment doors
in the building, for some unknown reason.” (quoting Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at
1423)); State v. Rendon, 477 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“The
officers’ presence at that location was for the express purpose of conducting a
search for illegal narcotics, which exceeded the scope of any express or implied
license that is generally limited to knocking on someone’s door.”); Jackson v.
State, No. 14–15–00244–CR, 2016 WL 2605784, at *6 (Tex. Ct. App. May 5,
2016) (holding that the use of a drug dog to sniff the front door of an
apartment “is indistinguishable from the way that officers deployed the
narcotics-detection dog in Rendon . . . [and] was a warrantless search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment”). C.f., United States v. Iverson, No. 14CR-197, 2016 WL 736451, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2016) (allowing evidence
where officers had no intention of searching for narcotics and where “a canine,
present in an apartment only as part of a search for a possible armed robber
reported by the apartment’s inhabitant, alerted for narcotics without an order
to search for narcotics and while restrained on a four-foot leash near the
entrance to the apartment”).

87.

United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 2016) (“We further
conclude that Officer Fear had no license to have Marco enter the curtilage
and sniff the door.”).

88.

Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416).
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“constitutionally protected area” safeguards to the front doors of
multiunit dwellings.

II. United States v. Whitaker: Expanding Jardines
Protections Through Justice Kagan’s Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy Analysis
In United States v. Whitaker, 89 the Seventh Circuit reached an
outcome similar to Hopkins—an unconstitutional dog sniff in front of
an apartment door—but not through the Jardines majority’s
constitutionally-protected area analysis. Instead, the Whitaker court
arrived at the conclusion through Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion
in Jardines,90 in which she argued that the dog sniff of Jardines’s door
was a violation of his reasonable expectation of privacy under both
Katz91 and Kyllo.92 Kagan, maintaining that Kyllo had already resolved
this question,93 noted that the police officers in Jardines “conducted a
search because they used a ‘device . . . not in general public use’ (a
trained drug-detection dog) to ‘explore the details of the home’ (the
presence of certain substances) that they would not otherwise have
discovered without entering the premises.”94 Whitaker evaluated the
legality of a dog sniff of an apartment door, not through a curtilagebased approach, but by invoking Kagan’s Kyllo-based concurrence.
On January 7, 2014, a Dane County Sheriff’s Deputy and his drug
sniffing K-9 partner, Hunter, arrived at an apartment building in
Madison, Wisconson.95 The dog alerted in front of Whitaker’s apartment and, after obtaining a warrant, the deputies arrested Whitaker
for possession of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana.96 Whitaker’s motion

89.

820 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2016).

90.

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).

91.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

92.

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).

93.

Kyllo, holding that a thermal-imaging device used to detect heat emanating
from a private home was an unconstitutional search, devised the rule that
where “the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to
explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.” Id. at 40.

94.

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1419 (Kagan, J., concurring).

95.

Whitaker, 820 F.3d at 851.

96.

Id. Whitaker also was charged with weapons possession, but he “told officers
about [the] handgun” and there is no indication that the K-9 sniff revealed
the weapon. Id.
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to suppress was denied by the district court,97 and he appealed on the
basis that he had an expectation of privacy in the apartment building’s
common hallway.98
Whitaker’s assertion of an expectation of privacy to the area in
front of his door was not a strongly supported claim—in fact, “the great
weight of authority is contrary to an assertion by a resident of a multiunit dwelling that he has an expectation of privacy in a common area
of that dwelling.”99 In those cases that did find an unconstitutional dog
sniff search based on a finding of curtilage, none simultaneously found
a violation of the reasonable expectation of privacy. 100 Despite the
97.

The district court adopted the Report and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge recommending that Whitaker’s motions be denied. Id. at
851–52.

98.

Id. at 852.

99.

Chase, supra note 13, at 1309. Chase notes that, as of publication in 2015,
the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits “have each
held that a tenant in a multi-unit dwelling has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in a common hallway.” Id. at 1308 (collecting cases); see also
Lindsey v. State, 127 A.3d 627, 644 (Md. App. 2015) (“[B]ecause the area
outside of appellant’s door was within a common area, he did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the same.”); State v. Craig, No. A12–
2217, 2014 WL 3557885, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. July 21, 2014) (“Our caselaw
holds that residents of a multi-occupancy building do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in common areas of the building.”); United States v.
Bain, 155 F. Supp. 3d 107, 117 (D. Mass. 2015) (“[T]he court concludes
that Bain has not demonstrated that he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the areas traversed by the officers in this case.”). There are some
outlying examples. E.g., United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 716 (9th
Cir. 1976) (recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallway
in the corridor separating the defendant’s door from the outer door of the
apartment building). But these holdings were often undercut within their
own circuits. See United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241–42 (9th Cir.
1993) (rejecting the idea of a tenant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in
the hallway of an apartment building).

100. United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e need not
rely on Katz . . . to decide our case because Marco’s presence on the
curtilage of Hopkins’ unit may be analyzed under Jardines . . . .”); United
States v. Burston, 806 F.3d 1123, 1126 n.4 (8th Cir. 2015) (declining to
address whether Burston’s reasonable expectation of privacy was violated and
noting that “[t]he decision [in Jardines] was based on the violation of the
defendant’s property, not privacy, rights”); People v. Burns, 50 N.E.3d 610,
622 (Ill. 2016) (“Our application of Jardines, however, makes it unnecessary
to address the merits of whether use of the drug-detection dog violated
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”). The majority opinion in
Rendon also did not address whether the apartment owner had an expectation
of privacy outside his apartment door. State v. Rendon, 477 S.W.3d 805, 811
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“As was the case in Jardines, given our conclusion
that the officers physically intruded into the curtilage of appellee’s home for
the purpose of gathering evidence, we need not decide whether the officers’
conduct in this case also violated his expectation of privacy . . . .”). The
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weight of case law pointing to the lack of any expectation of privacy in
the space in front of apartment doors, the Seventh Circuit sided with
Whitaker, holding that “the use of a drug-sniffing dog here clearly
invaded reasonable privacy expectations . . . .”101
The court grounded its reasoning in the Kagan concurrence of
Jardines as well as Kyllo. A dog search, the court noted, “conducted
from an apartment hallway comes within” the realm of Kyllo’s rule.102
The K-9 unit in this case was “a sophisticated sensing device not available to the general public” and “detected something (the presence
of drugs) that otherwise would have been unknowable without entering
the apartment.”103
In deciding as much, the Seventh Circuit overruled its prior precedent holding that “a tenant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the common areas of an apartment building,” including “[t]he area
outside one’s door.”104 The Whitaker court acknowledged that a tenant
does “not have a reasonable expectation of complete privacy in his
apartment hallway.” 105 The court instead suggested that apartment
tenants have an intermediate degree of privacy somewhere between
complete secrecy and the absence of any privacy. 106 It went on to
explain that “Whitaker’s lack of a reasonable expectation of complete
privacy in the hallway does not also mean that he had no reasonable
concurring opinion, however, while noting that “it is not necessary to decide
today whether the officers violated Rendon’s expectation of privacy under
Katz,” still “[wrote] separately to call attention to Justice Kagan’s”
concurrence from Jardines. Id. at 813 (Richardson, J., concurring).
101. Whitaker, 820 F.3d at 852.
102. Id. at 853.
103. Id. (first citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35–36, 40 (2001); and
then citing Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1418–19 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
concurring)).
104. United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991).
105. Whitaker, 820 F.3d at 853 (emphasis added).
106. Id. “Reasonable expectation of complete privacy” is a phrase that rarely
appears in case law. In those instances in which it appears, it generally denotes
a degree of privacy between that of complete openness to the public and
utmost secrecy. See, e.g., Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos.,
306 F.3d 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The California Supreme Court held that
given that the workplace where this conversation took place was not generally
open to the public, the plaintiff could have a reasonable expectation of privacy
against a television reporter’s covert videotaping of the conversation even
though the plaintiff lacked a reasonable expectation of complete privacy
because he was visible and audible to other coworkers.”); Liebeskind v.
Rutgers Univ., No. A-0544-12T1, 2014 WL 7662032, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div., Jan. 22, 2015) (“[Because] Rutgers had the right to examine
materials stored on workplace computers for improprieties[,] . . . plaintiff
had no reasonable expectation of complete privacy.”).
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expectation of privacy against persons in the hallway snooping into his
apartment using sensitive devices not available to the general public.”107
The court acknowledged the point relied upon by other jurisdictions to
find an absence of curtilage—namely that a tenant has no right to
exclude everyone from the hallway.108 However, the court found that
tenants have a right to “expect certain norms of behavior in [their]
apartment hallway” that do not include “park[ing] a sophisticated drugsniffing dog outside an apartment door, at least [not] without a
warrant.”109 This creation of an intermediate level of privacy protection
by the Whitaker court is an important break from prior precedent and
extends a “reasonable expectation of privacy” to residents of multiunit
dwellings, at least as far as the hallway space immediately in front of a
door.110

III. Post-Whitaker and Hopkins: Implications and
Ongoing Questions
A. Addressing the Economic and Racial Inequities
Stemming from Jardines

The Jardines majority’s reliance upon the conception of curtilage
and the absence of case law recognizing the existence of curtilage in an

107. Whitaker, 820 F.3d at 853.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 853–54. The court, in providing other examples, explained that a “police
officer might lawfully walk by and hear loud voices from inside an apartment[,
but this] does not mean he could put a stethoscope to the door to listen to all
that is happening inside.” Id. at 853. With that language in mind, a police
officer walking by and smelling narcotics without the aid of a drug sniffing
dog would not be conducting a search and would still have a lawful basis for
obtaining a warrant. This is alluded to as well by the Burns dissenting
opinion, which opined that “apartment doors that open to common areas of
multiunit apartment building have less home-shielding protection by
nature[,] . . . [resulting in] [o]dors, sounds, and activities [that] may be
detected from the vantage point of the common areas of the apartment
building where others may not be excluded.” People v. Burns, 50 N.E.3d 610,
641 (Ill. 2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
110. In the same term, the Seventh Circuit held that an apartment tenant did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an apartment basement
space. See United States v. Sweeney, 821 F.3d 893, 902–03 (7th Cir. 2016)
(“Here, where the basement space was shared by all of the tenants of the
apartment building, there was no individualized storage space and no door
or locked entry to the basement itself, it was not objectively reasonable that
the space would be assumed private. . . . [There is] no similar danger of
intrusion into the protected privacy of an apartment interior.” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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urban context111 led many critics to wonder whether Jardines would
usher in growing inequity in Fourth Amendment protections. Carol
Chase went so far as to claim that, under the Jardines majority’s
curtilage conception, “the Fourth Amendment may now be deemed to
provide greater protection against the use of drug-detection dogs to
dwellers of single-family dwellings than it does for those living in multiunit dwellings.”112 While Chase acknowledged the argument that “living
in close proximity to others provides less privacy in general than
residing in a more isolated setting,” she countered that “it is hard to
imagine that those drafting the Fourth Amendment would have
countenanced this type of unequal application of the protections which
they found sufficiently important to guarantee by constitutional
amendment.”113
The potential rural–urban division created by the uneven application of Jardines’s curtilage could not only lead to economic inequity,114 but racial unfairness as well.115 In terms of homeownership,

111. See Leonetti, supra note 7, at 303 (“[L]eading Supreme Court cases
delineating the modern scope of the curtilage doctrine . . . largely leave
unanswered the questions of whether curtilage exists in these urban
contexts, and if so, what the scope of urban curtilage is.”); see also Roth,
supra note 14, at 558 (“[T]he lower courts’ near unanimous conclusions have
been that neither property law nor privacy rights protect residents living in
multi-unit dwellings from dog sniff searches targeting their home but
conducted from hallways or common areas.”).
112. Chase, supra note 13, at 1311; see also Roth, supra note 14, at 553
(“Consequently, the Jardines decision threatens to diminish Fourth
Amendment protections for those citizens who do not live in single-family
detached houses.”).
113. Chase, supra note 13, at 1311; see also State v. Craig, No. A12-2217, 2014
WL 3557885, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. July 21, 2014) (finding residents of a
multifamily residence have a diminished expectation of privacy “because
common areas are ‘not subject to the exclusive control of one tenant and
[are] utilized by the tenants generally and the numerous visitors attracted
to a multiple-occupancy building’” (quoting State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d
789, 799 (Minn. 2012))).
114. Chase, supra note 13, at 1311 (“It becomes particularly disturbing once it
is recognized that in many settings those who reside in multi-unit dwellings
are financially less well-off than their neighbors in single-family
residences.”). For the second quarter of 2016, 77.8% of households with
family income greater than or equal to the median family income owned a
home, while only 48.0% of households with family income below the median
family income owned a home. See Residential Vacancies and
Homeownership in the Second Quarter 2016, U.S. Census Bureau 10
(July 28, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/
currenthvspress.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C6V-MBBA].
115. For the second quarter of 2016, the non-Hispanic-white rate of home ownership was 71.5%, while the rate of black and Hispanic homeowners was 41.7%
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there are far fewer non-white homeowners, and “minority households
have gained no ground in recent years.”116 The possible racial and economic imbalances created by Jardines are alarming considering that the
degree of Fourth Amendment protection could vary significantly based
on whether a resident’s home was free-standing or physically connected
to other dwellings.
The Seventh Circuit was acutely aware of the possible economic
and racial implications of Jardines when deciding Whitaker. In justifying its finding that an apartment tenant has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the space outside the front door, the court noted that “a
strict apartment versus single-family house distinction is troubling
because it would apportion Fourth Amendment protections on grounds
that correlate with income, race, and ethnicity.”117 Hopkins avoided any
such acknowledgement of broader social-equity concerns and took pains
to narrow its opinion to the particular circumstances of the case rather
than expanding a finding of curtilage to all apartment thresholds.118
The Burns concurrence, as well, identified the apartment-door
threshold as curtilage,119 a finding the dissent suspected was motivated
by “an egalitarian concern for creating privacy rights on par with the
occupants of single-family homes regardless of the significant legal

and 45.1% respectively. See Residential Vacancies and Homeownership in the
Second Quarter 2016, supra note 114, at 9.
116. Lisa Prevost, Gap Persists in Homeownership: Low-Income and Minority
Households Far Behind in Homeownership, N.Y. Times (Feb. 6, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/realestate/low-income-and-minorityhouseholds-far-behind-in-homeownership.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/T6LJ
-SJYY].
117. United States v. Whitaker, 820 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that
67.8% of households composed solely of whites live in one-unit detached
houses, while the percentage for black and Hispanic households was 47.2%
and 52.1% respectively, based on the data available through American
Housing Survey - Table Creator, U.S. Census Bureau, http://sasweb.ssd.
census.gov/ahs/ahstablecreator.html [https://perma.cc/2KG4-DCM9] (last
visited Oct. 4, 2016)).
118. United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 731–33 (8th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing
its curtilage-based holding from other cases that relied on an expectation-ofprivacy analysis and where there was a common hallway that all residents or
guests used); see also United States v. Brooks, 645 F.3d 971, 975 (8th Cir.
2011) (agreeing with the district court that the backyard of tenant’s house
was not curtilage); United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010)
(“In similar circumstances, we have upheld the use of a drug dog to sniff the
door of a hotel room from the hotel’s corridor.”); United States v. Roby, 122
F.3d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that Roby had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his hotel room, but not in the hotel corridor outside
the room).
119. People v. Burns, 50 N.E.3d 610, 635 (Ill. 2016) (Garman, C.J., concurring).
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differences between the two situations.”120 While it is true that there
are real differences in the relative privacy an apartment dweller can
expect, it is striking that their Fourth Amendment protection from
government interference may differ so drastically from citizens in singlefamily detached homes—especially when, “[i]n every relevant sense,” an
apartment’s “front door and landing appear indistinct from Jardines’s
front door and porch.”121 The Whitaker opinion is evidence that courts
are cognizant of the equal protection concerns voiced by critics of
Jardines.122
B. How Far Do Whitaker and Hopkins Reach (and Where Do They Go)?

Whitaker and Hopkins both affected multiunit-building residents,
but it is unclear how far the impact of these decisions will reach.123 As
previously mentioned, the Hopkins majority narrowed the scope of the
decision to the particular facts of the apartment complex in question.124
It remains to be seen whether the Eighth Circuit will extend its finding
of curtilage to traditional apartment buildings where tenants’ doors
open into interior hallways. The Seventh Circuit’s finding of an
apartment dweller’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior
corridor just outside the threshold of his door ensures that, relative to
Hopkins, the Whitaker decision will have a more significant impact
within its jurisdiction.
Do the decisions extend beyond the reach of apartment complexes
to other lodging arrangements? 125 Because the Hopkins holding is
120. Id. at 640 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 635 (Garman, C.J., concurring).
122. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 13, at 1311 (noting that the potentially lesser
protection afforded multiunit dwellers under the Fourth Amendment is not
“something that should be acceptable in a country founded upon the
principle that ‘all men are created equal’” (quoting The Declaration of
Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776))).
123. Though individual circumstances may vary based on the characteristics of the
apartment building, there are over 2.5 million apartment dwellers in the
Seventh Circuit. See Quick Facts: Resident Demographics, Nat’l
Multifamily Hous. Council, http://www.nmhc.org/Content.aspx?id=
4708 [https://perma.cc/MW3R-N3JR] (last updated Sept. 2015). Because the
Hopkins holding was narrower, it is unlikely that the jurisdiction’s lower
courts would find curtilage outside the front door of the majority of the Eighth
Circuit’s 1.84 million apartment dwellers. See id.
124. United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 2016) (“In our
case . . . there is no ‘common hallway’ which all residents or guests must
use to reach their units[,] . . . [and] Hopkins’ door faced outside.”).
125. At least one court has extended protections to the hallways of rooming houses,
which, unlike apartment buildings, do not have self-contained units with
bedrooms, kitchens, and bathrooms. See Logan v. Commonwealth, 616 S.E.2d
744, 749 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]t is not any inherent nature of a hallway
that controls, but rather what the hallway links (i.e., individual self-contained
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narrow, the protections at present may be limited to apartment complexes with direct exterior exits. 126 Because Whitaker specifically
warned that “[d]istinguishing Jardines based on the differences between
the front porch of a stand-alone house and the closed hallways of an
apartment building draws arbitrary lines,” not only does the decision
extend to every apartment complex, but likely includes other types of
housing with similar floorplans and spatial characteristics.127 Despite a
vast number of holdings to the contrary, the Whitaker decision could

living units versus shared traditional living areas).” (quoting State v. Titus,
707 So. 2d 706, 711 (Fla. 1998))). The principle in Logan could conceivably
be applied to “communal living” developments, which have recently taken
the form of millennial villages, micro-units, and adult dormitories. See, e.g.,
Dante Ramos, It Takes a ‘Millennial’ Village to Get Cheap Housing in Boston,
Boston Globe (Mar. 24, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
opinion/2015/03/24/takes-millennial-village-get-cheap-housing-boston/
Auwnx4NvrXtH8NJsu4BRxH/story.html [https://perma.cc/7RMW-TNFF]
(reporting on “millennial village” buildings where “younger workers can live
in close quarters and share living space[s]” such as a kitchen and living room);
Alana Semuels, Dorms for Grownups: A Solution for Lonely Millennials?,
The Atlantic (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2015/11/coliving/414531/ [https://perma.cc/K4KM-G2PD] (documenting a recent construction space with twenty-one micro-units which have
an individual “tiny kitchen” and bathroom, but share “a chef’s kitchen, a
game room, and a TV room”); Scott Van Voorhis, Micro-Units Pop Up in
Boston, Fetch High Prices, RealEstate (Nov. 26, 2014, 10:19 AM),
http://realestate.boston.com/news/2014/11/26/micro-units-pop-up-inboston-fetch-high-prices/ [https://perma.cc/75ZC-BVVX] (describing “tiny
new apartments” around 400 square feet with “common space”).
126. Though not as expansive as Whitaker, the Hopkins decision could reach a
large number of apartments and townhomes that have exterior entrances not
along a common corridor or walkway. In addition, single-story apartments
have grown in popularity and have an exterior entrance and walkway as well
as a separately accessed rear patio. See, e.g., Redwood Apartment Homes,
http://www.byredwood.com/ [https://perma.cc/V24F-WVS6] (last visited
Sept. 8, 2016) (“No one lives above or below you[.]”).
127. United States v. Whitaker, 820 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2016). Because the
court remarks upon the futility of distinguishing Jardines’s protections for
split-level duplexes, garden apartments, and houses that have been
converted to apartments, the language indicates the court intended its
ruling to have wider effect beyond traditional apartment buildings. Id.
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also be applied to the area just outside the doors of hotels,128 motels,129
and condominiums,130 though likely not to parking areas.131
C. Do Whitaker and Hopkins Conflict with Caballes and Place?

Perhaps the biggest obstacle blocking a complete embrace of the
Whitaker and Hopkins holdings is reconciling those decisions with the
Supreme Court’s prior rulings in United States v. Place132 and Illinois

128. The Supreme Court has recognized Fourth Amendment protection extends
to the inside of hotel and motel rooms, see Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483,
490 (1964) (“[A] guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”), but traditionally not to the
hallway outside the room. See, e.g., United States v. Legall, 585 F. App’x 4
(4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the contention, in a narcotics dog sniff outside a
hotel room, that a hotel hallway is curtilage and holding that the hotel guest
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in illegal narcotics (citing
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005))); United States v. Roby, 122
F.3d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Mr. Roby had an expectation of privacy in
his Hampton Inn hotel room[,] [b]ut because the corridor outside that room
is traversed by many people, his reasonable privacy expectation does not
extend so far.”); State v. Foncette, 356 P.3d 328, 331 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015)
(declining to find dog sniff outside a hotel door was a violation because,
“[a]lthough hotel guests are entitled to constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures that infringe on their expectation of
privacy within the room, the hallway outside Foncette’s hotel room was not
a private area” (citation omitted)).
129. See, e.g., Patel v. City of Montclair, 798 F.3d 895, 898–99 (9th Cir. 2015)
(affirming decision that officers’ entry onto the areas of the motel “open to
the public did not constitute a search”); Sanders v. Commonwealth, 772
S.E.2d 15, 23 (Va. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that motel guest “did not have
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the walkways directly
outside those [motel] doors or in the odors detectable by a drug dog while
standing on such walkways”).
130. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 862 N.W.2d 831, 838 (N.D. 2015) (declining to
find a search in the use of a drug dog outside a condominium door because,
although “[i]t is undisputed Williams has a [possessory] property interest in
the hallway [as an owner of the condo], his interest is not exclusive . . . and
[he] cannot unilaterally exclude individuals”).
131. A parking space, unlike the area outside an apartment door, is unlikely to
be used for “storing personal belongings in an exclusively controlled area or
conducting other personal activities such as we would equate with a garage
attached to a single family home.” State v. Dumstrey, 873 N.W.2d 502, 514–
15 (Wis. 2016) (holding that tenant’s underground parking garage is not
curtilage and he does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
garage because, if he did, “such an expectation is surely not reasonable”);
Willig v. Swarts, No. 1:12-CV-1649, 2015 WL 5093771, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.
28, 2015) (declining to recognize an expectation of privacy in a parking lot
adjacent to a business because “courts typically decline to extend the Fourth
Amendment’s expectation of privacy protection beyond the home”).
132. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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v. Caballes.133 The Place and Caballes decisions declined to find a violation of the Fourth Amendment in the warrantless dog sniff of an
automobile during a traffic stop 134 and the luggage of an airport
traveler.135 Both cases relied on the premise that a canine sniff is limited
in the information revealed.136 Of particular significance to those judges
disinclined to find a Fourth Amendment violation in drug dog sniffs of
door thresholds is Justice Stevens’s attempt to reconcile Caballes with
Kyllo. 137 Stevens concluded that “[t]he legitimate expectation that
information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is
categorically distinguishable from respondent’s hopes or expectations
concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car.”138
Unlike the thermal-imaging device of Kyllo that “was capable of
detecting lawful activity,” 139 the drug dog “does not expose
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public
view.”140 Courts finding government overreach in the use of drug dogs
on the threshold of a front door have been forced to contemplate
possible inconsistencies with Place and Caballes.
This critique was present in Jardines itself by way of Justice Alito’s
dissent.141 In answering Justice Kagan’s concurrence, Alito countered
that there is “no basis for concluding that the occupants of a dwelling
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in odors that emanate from
133. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
134. Id. at 409 (“Accordingly, the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog—
one that ‘does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain
hidden from public view’—during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not
implicate legitimate privacy interests.” (citation omitted) (quoting Place,
462 U.S. at 707)).
135. Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (concluding that the dog sniff of “respondent’s
luggage, which was located in a public place, . . . did not constitute a
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”).
136. Id. (“We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both
in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the
information revealed by the procedure.”); Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410 (“A dog
sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no
information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any
right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
137. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (stating that the finding that the canine sniff of an
automobile was not a Fourth Amendment violation “is entirely consistent
with our recent decision that the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect
the growth of marijuana in a home constituted an unlawful search” (citing
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001))).
138. Id. at 410.
139. Id. at 409 (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38).
140. Id. (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707).
141. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1420 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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the dwelling and reach spots where members of the public may lawfully
stand.” 142 While pointing to decisions upholding a police officer’s
sensing the odor of narcotics as a basis for probable cause, 143 Alito
challenges Kagan’s use of Kyllo, remarking that “[t]his Court . . . has
already rejected the argument that the use of a drug-sniffing dog is the
same as the use of a thermal imaging device.”144 Alito’s criticism has
been echoed in a multitude of cases that considered the constitutionality
of dog sniffs at the front doors of multiunit-building residents.145
Hopkins does not address Caballes or Place in its finding that a dog
sniff at the front door was an unlicensed search within a constitutionally
protected area.146 The court likely relied upon Scalia’s rebuttal to Alito
in Jardines.147 Scalia did not contest the State’s (and Alito’s dissenting)
argument that a forensic narcotics dog “cannot implicate any legitimate
privacy interest” because he felt it unnecessary.148 Because, he reasoned,
“[t]he Katz reasonable-expectations test ‘has been added to, not
substituted for,’ the traditional property-based understanding of the
Fourth Amendment . . . [it] is unnecessary to consider when the
government gains evidence by physically intruding on constitutionally

142. Id. at 1424.
143. Id. at 1425 (first citing United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 482 (1985)
(holding that officers had established probable cause after detecting the odor
of marijuana); then citing United States v. Johnston, 497 F.2d 397, 398 (9th
Cir. 1974) (holding that there is no “reasonable expectation of privacy from
drug agents with inquisitive nostrils”)).
144. Id. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10).
145. See, e.g., Sanders v. Commonwealth, 772 S.E.2d 15, 25 (Va. Ct. App. 2015)
(“As used here, a dog ‘does not detect anything inside a [motel room], but
merely detects the particulate odors that have escaped from a [motel room].
In that sense, the odors are no longer private, but instead are intermingled
with the public airspace containing the incriminating odor.’”); State v.
Foncette, 356 P.3d 328, 332 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) (“‘[A]ny interest in
possessing contraband cannot be deemed legitimate,’ and thus state actions
that reveal only contraband do not compromise any privacy interest that
society accepts as reasonable.” (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408)); United
States v. Legall, 585 F. App’x. 4, 6 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Because the drugdetecting dog disclosed only the presence of illegal narcotics, we find that
the dog-sniff did not violate Legall’s legitimate expectation of privacy.”);
State v. Rendon, 477 S.W.3d 805, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (Yeary, J.,
dissenting) (“A narcotics dog is trained to alert only to the presence of illicit
contraband . . . [and] [i]t does not otherwise ‘explore details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrustion[.]’” (first
citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409; then quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40)).
146. United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 2016).
147. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
148. Id.

332

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 1·2016
Growing Jardines

protected areas.” 149 Because the Jardines Court “did not reach the
expectation of privacy test,” the Eighth Circuit held that it too “need
not rely on Katz . . . because [the dog’s] presence on the curtilage of
Hopkins’ unit may be analyzed under Jardines[.]”150 Citing the language
of Jardines, courts that rely upon a “constitutionally protected area”
analysis to find a Fourth Amendment violation in drug dog sniffs have
not felt compelled to address Caballes and Place.151
The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, was forced to address Place and
Caballes in finding a violation of Whitaker’s reasonable expectation of
privacy. 152 As with its central holding, the court looked to Justice
Kagan’s concurrence for its rationale—because, the court finds, “this
was a search of a home,” it is “distinguishe[d] . . . from dog sniffs in
public places” as occurred in Place and Caballes.153 The court echoes
Kagan’s assertion that neither Place nor Caballes “implicated the
Fourth Amendment’s core concern of protecting the privacy of the
home.”154 The language of Caballes could be read to differentiate its
holding from Kyllo based on both the dog’s inability to detect lawful
activity (unlike a thermal imager) and the location in which the sniff
took place (a house in Kyllo and a roadside traffic stop in Caballes).155
Justice Kagan and the Seventh Circuit point to the latter basis for
finding that the same lawful drug sniff outside a car door could be
rendered illegal when conducted outside a home’s front door.156
149. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950–
52 (2012)).
150. Hopkins, 824 F.3d at 732.
151. See supra note 100.
152. United States v. Whitaker, 820 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2016).
153. Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405 (2005)).
154. Id.; see also Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1419 n.1 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring)
(“But Caballes concerned a drug-detection dog’s sniff of an
automobile . . . [a]nd we have held, over and over again, that people’s
expectations of privacy are much lower in their cars than in their homes.”
(citation omitted)).
155. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10.
156. An interesting alternative argument centers on a claim that a drug dog can
often detect lawful substances. This question was before the Maryland
Court of Appeals where the petitioner asserted that the drug dog’s “ability
to detect diazepam tablets, available by prescription, as well as prohibited
narcotics, expanded the scope of [the dog’s] sniff resulting in it becoming a
search.” Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1009 (Md. 2004). If the dog
could detect a lawful substance such as prescription drugs, or for that
matter electronics or legal marijuana in some states, would that undercut
the Caballes rationale that drug dogs do “not expose noncontraband items”
and therefore constitute a violation under Kyllo? Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
Some dogs are in fact “trained to locate the odor of substances that are
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Conclusion
Whitaker and Hopkins are significant expansions of the Jardines
protection against warrantless drug dog sniffs at the threshold of a
home’s front door. Importantly, these decisions expanded what many
had considered to be a detached-house protection to residents of
multiunit buildings. While both arrived at a similar conclusion—a
Fourth Amendment violation for a dog sniff conducted outside the front
door—the Seventh and Eighth Circuits based their rulings on different
analyses. The Eighth Circuit decided Hopkins under the constitutionally protected area test of the Jardines majority opinion, while
the Seventh Circuit grounded its reasoning in Whitaker in the
reasonable expectation of privacy test of Katz, Kyllo, and Kagan’s concurrence in Jardines. It remains to be seen whether Whitaker or Hopkins
are springboards for further extensions of protections against
unwarranted dog sniffs outside homes and which underlying analysis
serves as the vehicle for such expansions.
Perhaps the strongest foundation for protecting homes from unwarranted drug dog sniffs can be obtained by harmonizing the Jardines
majority and concurring opinions. This point was elaborated upon by
Chief Justice Garman of the Illinois Supreme Court in her concurring
opinion in Burns.157 Jardines, she writes, “does not turn on protecting
a zone outside the house for activities and possessions,” but instead on
“the vantage point of the officers on the curitlage and their actions in
observing Jardines’ activities within the home.” 158 In what she
characterizes as a shield-based understanding of the principle
underlying Jardines, Chief Justice Garman argues that “while the porch
was deemed to be a ‘constitutionally protected area,’ the propertybased fourth amendment interest to be vindicated was centered within
the home.”159
legal to possess, such as prescription drugs or alcohol” and “may alert to
odors of legal substances.” See Mark E. Smith, Comment, Going to the
Dogs: Evaluating the Proper Standard for Narcotic Detector Dog Searches
of Private Residences, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 103, 122 (2009). The Maryland
Court of Appeals avoided addressing the question because the petitioner
did not raise the issue during the motion to suppress. Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d
at 1018.
157. People v. Burns, 50 N.E.3d 610, 631 (Ill. 2016) (Garman, C.J., concurring).
158. Id. at 634.
159. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415). This
approach, favored by Professor Orin Kerr, arguably provides the best way
forward by ignoring as irrelevant “the fact that the dog was in the hallway.”
Orin Kerr, Use of a Drug-Sniffing Dog at an Apartment Door is a ‘Search,’
7th Circuit Holds, Wash. Post: Volokh Conspiracy (Apr. 13, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2016/04/13/use-of-a-drug-sniffing-dog-at-an-apartment-door-is-a-search7th-circuit-holds/ [https://perma.cc/YXC5-UUFR]. Instead, Kerr maintains
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This point dovetails well with Justice Kagan’s distinguishing of
Caballes from Kyllo by focusing upon the target of the search rather
than the location of the searcher.160 This understanding is also advanced
by Judge Greene’s dissenting opinion in Fitzgerald.161 In contesting the
majority’s concern with “whether the dog was permitted outside the
object sniffed,” Greene writes that “I would have no quarrel with this
analysis if the scope and nature of the ‘search’ was an object, i.e., an
automobile, piece of luggage, or the like used in transit,” rather than
residences.162 This focus upon the target of the search is strongly rooted
in Kyllo,163 reconciles Whitaker with Caballes and Place, and would lead
to a more even application of Fourth Amendment protections to
multiunit dwellings.
Eric Connon†

that “[w]hat matters is that the dog was used to learn facts from inside the
apartment that were previously unknowable without physical entry.” Id.
160. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1418 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[T]hat device
was aimed here at a home—the most private and inviolate (or so we expect)
of all the places and things the Fourth Amendment protects.”); see also
Roth, supra note 14, at 568 (“Justice Kagan’s opinion impliedly
acknowledged the important distinction between the target of a search and
the location of a search.”).
161. Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1023 (Greene, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 1024.
163. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding that police officers’
observation of a house using thermal-imaging technology, and, more
generally, “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’”
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. (quoting Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
†

J.D. Candidate, 2017, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I
would like to thank my incredible wife, Kelly, whose love, patience, and
support made law school possible; my parents, who have assisted me on my
long academic journey; and my dog, Buddy, whose dog sniffs are always
constitutional.

335

